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Octave Mannoni’s Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of  Colonization ([1950] 1964) adopts a 
clearly outdated colonial worldview. Nonetheless, I argue that it must still be critiqued, since 
its colonial legacy is apparent in the variants of  racial and colonial logics and hierarchies at 
work in contemporary psychiatric, sociological, and philosophical descriptions of  violence. 
In Black Skin, White Masks ([1952] 2008), Frantz Fanon refutes the theses of  The Psychology 
of  Colonization, written by his friend and colleague Mannoni, by linking them to colonial 
attitudes prevalent in classical French psychiatry and psychoanalysis (Baladier 1984, 16). It 
was not the first time that Fanon critiqued French colonial psychiatry. In “The North African 
Syndrome” ([1952] 1967), Fanon voiced his opposition to the work of  the Antoine Porot, 
an ethno-psychiatrist and professor in the psychiatric school of  Algiers. Porot’s student Don 
Côme Arrii’s 1925 thesis, “The Criminal Impulsivity of  the Algerian” was later revised and 
published in the Annales in 1932, under both Porot and Arrii. Advocating for a stringent 
policing regime in colonial cities, they construct the North African mind as constitutionally 
criminal (Keller 2007, 138-140). Ranjana Khanna notes that this type of  pathology upheld 
the immutable immorality and criminality of  the Arab ‘Algerian’ Muslim,” naturally 
prone to the automatic reflexes against the self-reflexive moral consciousness of  the white 
European Christian, whose pathological responses led to suicidal thoughts (2003, 177). 
In 1955, Fanon would publish another attack on Porot’s views entitled “Ethnopsychiatric 
Considerations.” After first debunking Porot in “The North African Syndrome” ([1952] 
1967), Fanon turns his attention, in Black Skin, White Masks ([1952] 2008), to Mannoni, 
whom he accuses of  echoing the views of  the Algerian school, despite Mannoni’s rejection 
of  the notion of  fixed biological races.
Fanon argues that this notion of  racial difference remains implicit in Mannoni’s 
paternalistic attitude toward the colonized. Hence, Mannoni’s book is the focus of  “The So-
Called Dependency Complex of  the Colonized,” chapter 4 of  Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon 
shows how Mannoni redeploys the racial hierarchies to theorize Madagascan inferiority 
vis-à-vis the French colonizer, despite the differences in Mannoni’s understanding, which 
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held that these hierarchies were not fixed, but instead delegate evolutionary stages to the 
different “races.” Mannoni writes against French psychiatric theory, which does not address 
the particularity of  the colonial situation. Accordingly, he mobilizes psychoanalytic theory 
to critique the idea of  racially fixed categories, using social evolutionary theory to displace 
the views of  the Algerian school. But Fanon shows that the idea of  racial and colonial 
inferiority lingers in Mannoni’s psychoanalysis.
The academic disciplines at the fin de siècle engaged in ideas about evolution. Hence, 
new theories in psychological discourse were influenced by social Darwinism. This led 
figures such as Auguste Marie to bring evolutionary biology into the field of  comparative 
psychology, drawing on “Lamarck, Haeckel, and Darwin to argue that physiological and 
evolutionary factors accounted for psychological differences among populations” (Keller 
2007, 126-127). Influenced by these trends in early twentieth century theory, Mannoni 
combined “European history, ontogeny and revolutionary theory” to characterize the 
psychological development of  the Madagascans. According to Bloch, Mannoni drew 
together Durkheim, Tonnies, and Dumont, among others, to theorize social evolution in 
the colonial context (1990, viii).
Section I of  this paper delineates the flaws in Mannoni’s attempt to move beyond the 
limits of  colonial psychiatry by embracing social evolutionary theory.1 Mannoni admitted to 
this error in regard to the origins of  psychic disorders in 1966, when he published both the 
second edition of  his book and “The Decolonisation of  Myself.” But his 1950 publication 
remains historically important, since it reveals the extent to which a faith in human 
hierarchies forbade the recognition of  the role of  colonial violence in the development of  
psychic trauma. Section II examines Fanon’s critique of  Mannoni, to reveal the violent 
origins of  psychic trauma in the colonies, which remain undetected in colonial psychiatry 
and psychoanalysis, including the work of  Mannoni. Fanon suggests a relation between the 
violent event of  colonization and the development of  psychic disorders, thereby offering 
a theory of  colonial trauma as socially and politically constituted. Section III proposes 
that Fanon invites Catherine Malabou’s elucidation of  psychic causality in situations of  
extreme violence. I read Fanon’s critique of  Mannoni in relation to Malabou’s redefinition 
of  trauma and her concepts of  cerebrality and the new wounded. Malabou examines the 
PTSD diagnosis, to argue for a theory of  neuropsychiatric trauma, which moves beyond 
the Freudian concept of  the traumatic neurosis. She proposes the concepts of  cerebrality 
1 Bloch writes: “Mannoni’s general evolutionary theory is reminiscent of  both earlier theorizing by such 
writers as Durkheim and Tonnies and subsequent theorizing by authors such as Dumont. This is no 
accident, since what we are presented with is, under a thin disguise, very much the ‘received’ view of  social 
evolution that became accepted in the earlier part of  the twentieth century through the gradual osmosis 
into general currency of  the theories of  nineteenth-century anthropologists and social scientists. As was 
the case for many of  these early writers, Mannoni’s argument combines European history, ontogeny, and 
evolutionary anthropology” (1990, viii). According to Bloch, Mannoni’s embrace of  social evolutionary 
theory reflected the views of  his academic milieu, and eventually led to his flawed interpretation of  the 
1947 Madagascan revolts.
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and the new wounded, which respectively allow for the exposure of  psychic causality (in the 
absence of  neurosis) and the self-representation of  survivors of  PTSD.
I propose that Fanon’s critique of  the naturalized racial hierarchies is linked to Malabou’s 
understanding of  the obfuscation of  political oppression today. Fanon was critical of  
recurrent eugenicist theories.2 The sub-categories of  the human race, formulated into a 
hierarchical order that excluded the Black, evolved during the period of  colonization into a 
modern scientific ranking of  congenital markings, attributed to discrete racial identities. The 
historical archive of  racial identities was thus built on the pseudo-scientific categorization 
of  innate, biological differences among the “races.” Because these differences were deemed 
to be biologically determined, they appeared as “natural” and hence irredeemable. In this 
light, the racism implicit in this hierarchization was depoliticized, and a language that 
naturalized the state of  racial oppression developed to obfuscate the oppressive relation and 
negate the possibility for revolt, since one cannot revolt against a naturally given condition. 
The intention behind this obfuscation was a racially predetermined access to freedom in 
favor of  the white colonizer. It permeated western thought and infiltrated psychoanalytic 
and psychiatric theories in the colonial area. 
Malabou, I argue, critically inherits Fanon’s understanding that the oppressive 
relation is hidden in a language of  naturalization vis-à-vis racial difference, to analyze 
present iterations of  violent oppression as obfuscated by a language of  naturalization. 
She views these iterations as dissimulated events, which lack an identifiable perpetrator 
or even an instance. Hence, the naturalization of  violent oppression results in the loss of  
an understanding of  the motivation for the oppressive state. Since it becomes difficult 
to separate a naturally occurring catastrophe from a political event, the event cannot be 
comprehended as intentional. Moreover, she writes, “the sheer number of  these traumatic 
events tends to neutralize their intention, such that they assume the unmotivated character 
of  the chance, uninterpretable event” (2012, 155). Malabou attempts to account for the 
scale of  today’s violence, which, she argues, reduces the ability to identify any motivation 
for this violence. 
In other words, Malabou intimates that the naturalization of  instances of  violence 
today obfuscates the culpable actors and systems wielding oppressive forms of  power. She 
implicitly states that this illegibility cannot be addressed in the absence of  the designation 
of  the evental cause of  psychic wounds and traumas. In my view, this also calls for a 
critique of  power, in order to illuminate political injustices and demand the revolutionary 
transformation of  social, economic, and political systems. But today’s forms of  violence, 
which sustain the forces of  contemporary globalization, conceal their intentionality. 
I thus concur with Malabou that it falls to trauma scholars to expose the concealed or 
2 In chapter 5 of  Black Skin, White Masks, “The Lived Experience of  the Black Man,” Fanon refers 
to Jon Alfred Mjoen’s (1921) “Harmonic and Disharmonic Race-Crossings” (2008, 99). This note 
reveals that eugenics was accepted in mainstream literature, even after its scientific debunking. 
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absent event and its related wounds. Fanon rejects the practice of  naturalizing racial and 
colonial violence in the period of  colonization. Malabou appropriates Fanon’s concept of  
naturalization to critique today’s obfuscations of  traumatic events, which appear either as 
“unexpected” accidental events or as ones necessitated by the indifferent logic of  “natural 
law” (2012, 11). In either case, the oppressive force has not been identified, interpreted, 
critiqued, and resisted.
I argue for mobilizing both Fanon and Malabou to develop new critiques of  oppressive 
power, which analyze the sociopolitical violence that triggers new wounds and traumas. 
Hence, a critique of  power, which examines the recurrence of  racial and colonial hierarchies 
in the present, is essential if  the evidence of  the globalized psychiatric profile of  PTSD is to 
address the long-term effects of  the histories of  racial and colonial trauma.
 
I. MANNONI’S FLAWED CRITIQUE OF COLONIAL PSYCHIATRY
As contemporaries, Mannoni and Fanon both attempted to understand the impact 
of  the colonial encounter on the psyche, by developing new methods other than those 
offered by the classical European psychoanalytic and psychiatric traditions. In effect, their 
views converged in regard to the ineffectuality of  colonial psychiatry, and both explored 
psychoanalytic theory to dispute the use of  racial categories, touted by ethno-psychiatrists 
in the Algiers school of  psychiatry (Khanna 2003).
Despite their affinities, however, their views of  the 1947 revolts in Madagascar were 
fundamentally opposed. What Mannoni saw as manifestations of  engrained “native” 
pathologies, Fanon saw as expressions of  liberation, with the subsequent military repression 
triggering psychic disturbances in the colonized. According to Fanon, Mannoni’s failure 
to disavow the naturalized racial hierarchies engrained in colonial psychiatry is related to 
his disregard of  the Madagascan liberation struggle. Instead of  considering the impact of  
violent oppression on the colonized psyche, Mannoni proposes an unconscious signification 
for “inferiority complexes,” unrelated to violent rule. As Fanon illustrates, Mannoni’s 
dependency complex can address neither concrete politics nor how the colonial situation 
works toward the destruction of  the colonized psyche. In this regard, Mannoni neglects 
the ongoing anticolonial revolution, as well as how the colonizer’s violence restructures the 
imaginary of  the colonized.
In contrast, Fanon views the 1947 events as anticolonial revolts, violently repressed by 
the French colonial army. Fanon declares 80,000 deaths, but the figure of  approximately 
100,000 Madagascans is cited by Bloch (1990, v). Nigel C. Gibson (2003) contends that the 
lack of  reference to this massacre in the French media resulted in the loss of  an opportunity 
to acknowledge the severe forms of  political repression, including mass death, perpetrated 
by the French colonial state. This led to the concurrent loss of  an ability to recognize the 
existence of  liberation struggles against colonial power. Gibson concludes that the dearth of  
French press coverage of  the 1947 massacre is linked to the lack of  coverage of  massacres in 
other French colonies, including the 1945 massacre of  45,000 in Sétif, Algeria (56). Hence, 
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the press silence in regard to the 1947 revolt reflected the habit of  denying responsibility for 
massacres in other French colonies. According to Bloch, “Mannoni’s lack of  understanding 
of  the revolt of  1947 is in part explicable by the fact that exactly what happened remained 
for a long time very obscure, thanks, no doubt, to systematic disinformation by the French 
authorities” (1990, vii). 
Rather than concede to the fact that the violent repression following the 1947 revolts 
had a negative impact on the colonized psyche, Mannoni uses social evolutionary theory to 
diagnose psychic trauma. Fanon critiques Mannoni for appropriating a social evolutionary 
theory to transmute debunked racial hierarchies, and therefore revive the pseudo-scientific 
racial categories in a different form. Even as Mannoni affirms a future “equal” psychic 
structure, he does not divest this view from the concept of  racial inferiority. The white 
European is placed above the racialized and colonized other, according to an evolutionary 
scale of  linear progression vis-à-vis European social classes. Thus, he mimes the logic of  
racial hierarchies, with the caveat that the colonized are now assigned a future potential, 
thanks to social evolutionary theory.
Mannoni shares with Porot, and colonial psychiatry in general, the view that the 
racialized and colonized other lacks the cognitive capacity for self-determination, and 
hence the ability to galvanize an organized revolutionary response. Unlike Porot, however, 
Mannoni proposes that this future liberation from servitude is dependent on the colonized 
acquiring the necessary psychical structure to become the equals of  their colonizers. In 
effect, this requires them to become Europeans. Until then, they must be subjected to a 
“long tutelage” by the colonizer, whose (white) burden is to instruct them in the desire for 
liberation—a classical colonial project of  racial and cultural inferiorization, even after the 
biological argument is ostensibly negated. But Mannoni’s theory could only be affirmed, 
according to Fanon, by disregarding the political importance of  the armed insurrections 
from below.
Mannoni’s appropriation of  social evolutionary theory reflects received views, in the 
early twentieth century, of  nineteenth-century theories that blended historical, ontogenic, 
and evolutionary concepts, to construct a linear progression upward from primitivism to 
feudalism to republicanism in Europe. Deploying it to demote the “natives,” Mannoni draws 
an equivalence between Madagascans and feudal European serfs. He therefore professes to 
depart from the notion of  fixed categories for biological race, only to reconfigure them in an 
effort to justify French colonial power. This allows Mannoni to acknowledge the existence 
of  the 1947 revolt without regarding its political character; instead, he classifies it as an 
effect of  a pathology, which, in his view, replicates childhood abandonment syndrome. In 
psychoanalysis, this syndrome describes the experience of  human development, in which the 
child’s recalcitrant behavior is deemed a psychic response to the loss of  parental authority. 
Unlike the adolescent, who ranks higher on the social evolutionist’s ladder, (experiencing 
abandonment but advancing toward freedom), the child cannot yet realize this movement. 
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In likening the European child’s play to “‘primitive’ peoples” who “play at being the 
totem,” for instance, Mannoni infantilizes the colonized (1990, 82). This infantilization 
further reinforces his view of  naturalized inferiority. 
But Mannoni also pathologizes the “colonial” functionary, who carries out the 
administrative duties of  the regime. He contrasts the “strong character” of  the “real 
colonizer” with the “typical colonial”: the former is characterized as impervious to contact 
with the “natives,” whereas the latter is described as affected by an exposure to the “native” 
(1990, 97). Hence, the capacity to be changed by human interaction with the colonized 
is explained in terms of  “complex-determined feelings roused by the colonial situation” 
(88). According to Mannoni, after failing to make the transition to freedom in Europe, 
the colonial compensates for this failure by dominating the “natives,” in whom he finds 
an ideal state of  dependence. On the other hand, the colonized welcome the authority of  
their colonial masters as a matter of  providence. Of  the arrival of  the Europeans, Mannoni 
writes, “it can safely be said that their coming was unconsciously expected—even desired—
by the future subject peoples” (86). This is one of  a number of  passages in Mannoni’s 
book that Fanon critiques, when he asserts that the colonized do not look to the European 
colonizer as the “awaited master” (2008, 79).
Mannoni infantilizes the non-European Madagascans in relation to the European 
father figure by drawing his idea of  dependence from different theories circulating in the 
early twentieth century, including those of  “Freud, Jung, Adler, and Kunkel; Shakespeare 
and Defoe; Lévy-Bruhl and a few anthropological sources” (Khanna 2003, 149). He argues 
that Madagascans remain psychically underdeveloped, thus incapable of  self-rule, since 
they lack the cognitive capacity requisite for liberation. For Mannoni, the figure of  the 
patriarchal father, which he wrongly assumes to be predominant across Madagascan tribal 
tradition, provides anthropological evidence for his view that Madagascans are predisposed 
to a state of  dependence. Of  course, his interpretation of  tribal tradition has since been 
shown to contain errors and abstractions.3 Mannoni held that Madagascans had lost their 
original bond with their primitive tribal fathers in the colonial situation. Mannoni explains 
that the Europeans were at first unaware that “in the network of  dependences they occupied 
roughly the same position as the dead ancestors” (1990, 87). In other words, European rule 
took over from the rule of  the “dead ancestors,” ostensibly engrained in tribal tradition. 
Mannoni views the 1947 revolt as a manifestation of  aggressive responses related to feelings 
of  abandonment rather than a struggle for liberation. He concludes that the loosening of  
despotic rule by the French colonial state led to the rebellion in 1947. The Madagascans’ 
revolt was, in his view, irrational—the result of  the pathological complex of  dependency, 
related to an underdeveloped psychical character, unprepared for the responsibilities of  
self-determination.
3 Bloch describes the imprecisions in Mannoni’s understanding of  Madagascan social and cultural 
traditions and concludes that “Mannoni knew little about either the Malagasy in general or the causes 
of  the revolt in particular” (1990, vi).
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Bloch explains that Mannoni’s interpretation of  the rebellion omits key historical facts. 
In 1942, Madagascan independence seemed assured, due to the defeat of  the Vichy regime 
by the allies. But the movement toward independence was reversed once colonial power 
was reestablished in the wake of  World War II (Bloch 1990, x). It is therefore more likely 
that the rebellion was inspired by the anticolonial movements taking place in Indo-China. 
Moreover, many of  the anticolonial leaders in Madagascar were nationalist politicians and 
former soldiers discharged from the French army, not tribal chiefs. According to Bloch, 
Mannoni misreads the situation that gave rise to the rebellion of  1947.
Evidently, Mannoni’s colonial worldview made a political revolution from below illegible 
to him. Bracketing the anticolonial revolts and the ensuing massacre perpetrated by the 
French colonial state allowed Mannoni to diagnose congenital inferiority complexes, despite 
his rejection of  the idea that this inferior state could not be transcended. Mannoni also 
lacked general knowledge in regard to the cultural complexity and diversity of  Madagascan 
peoples and traditions, including the existence of  matriarchal and egalitarian relational 
structures (Bloch 1990). Clearly, a “Millian” form of  epistemological ignorance permeates 
Mannoni’s justification of  colonial oppression.4 
According to the logic of  his colonial model, Madagascans would be forced to 
assimilate into European cultural, social, economic, and political systems. Mannoni held 
that the colonial relation would eventually collapse under the pressure of  revolutionary 
republicanism. But, in the colonial context, Madagascans remained dependent on the 
colonizer. This dependency would only be surpassed once the colonized psyche was 
transformed by the processes of  colonization. What is demanded is the eventual erasure of  
non-European forms of  existence. 
Thus, while Mannoni does repudiate the congenital categories of  race produced by 
colonial psychiatry, he does not divest himself  of  the hierarchical view of  human existence 
from the colonizer’s perspective, at least in 1950, the year of  the publication of  The Psychology 
of  Colonization. In 1966, Mannoni critiqued his earlier theory of  social evolution for its 
exclusion of  the social and economic context of  Madagascar. Nevertheless, an examination 
of  the 1950 work draws out a reading of  Mannon’s disregard of  the violent political upheavals 
in Madagascar, which took place during his tenure as a colonial officer from the late 1920s 
until the early 1950s (Khanna 2003, 150). Certainly, Mannoni’s flawed 1950 attempt to 
revise European psychoanalytic theory for the colonial context systematically ignored the 
4 Charles Mills develops his concept of  the “epistemology of  ignorance” in The Racial Contract (1997), and 
later widens it to include all forms of  ‘active forgetting’ in “Epistemological Ignorance,” an entry in the 
collection 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology (2019). In The Racial Contract, he argues that the concept 
of  epistemic knowledge demands an active forgetting, which produces the suppressed truths of  racial 
oppression. In the latter work, he writes, “Knowing as a general cognitive ideal will thus require whenever necessary, 
knowing to not-know” (110). In both sources, Mills uncovers suppressed truths within liberal forms of  
knowing, classing them within an epistemology of  ignorance, which perpetuates the oppressive practices, 
ostensibly negated within the history of  egalitarian liberalism.
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negative impact of  colonial violence on the psychic life of  Madagascans. Consequently, 
Mannoni fails to theorize the violent origins of  psychic trauma in the colonies. 
Fanon rejects the validity of  Mannoni’s model of  the dependency complex, arguing 
instead that the phenomenon of  dependency emerged from the colonial situation, not vice 
versa (Khanna 2003, 154). According to Fanon, Mannoni is wrong to attribute rebellious 
action by the colonized to unconscious complexes. What emerges is a pattern of  attempts 
to justify colonial power by pathologizing resistance. 
In section II, I read Fanon’s critique of  Mannoni’s racialized pathologies. In section 
III, I propose that both Fanon’s theory of  colonial trauma and Malabou’s concepts of  
cerebrality and the new wounded be mobilized to theorize the violent origins of  psychic 
trauma.
 
II. FANON’S THEORY OF COLONIAL TRAUMA
As a clinical psychiatrist, Fanon believed that his racialized patients were misdiagnosed 
largely because the systemic racism experienced by North African immigrants in colonial 
France was unacknowledged by the clinicians working in French psychiatric hospitals 
(1967). During his employment in French hospitals, Fanon developed an understanding of  
the gaps in the treatment of  his North African patients. He later extended this critique of  
the ineffectuality of  psychiatry and psychoanalysis to the Madagascan context described 
by Mannoni. His subsequent clinical practices in Algeria and Tunisia were central to his 
later psychiatric assessments of  the colonized. While The Wretched of  the Earth ([1961] 2004) 
addresses the psychiatric conditions triggered by colonization, Black Skin, White Masks 
critiques the “invisible” causal structure of  psychic trauma in the colonies and explores 
psychoanalytic theory for descriptions of  the Black psyche. Fanon proposes that the 
task of  thinking psychic trauma in the colonies demands an analysis of  the experience 
of  colonization. His theory of  colonial trauma therefore integrates the effects of  violent 
oppression.
  
FANON ON THE MADAGASCANS 
In chapter 4 of  Black Skin, White Masks, “The So-Called Dependency Complex of  the 
Colonized,” Fanon opposes the naturalization of  racial and colonial inferiority in Mannoni’s 
psychoanalytic reading. He rejects the characterization of  the Madagascans as dependent, 
which, according to Mannoni, naturally predisposes them to a state of  servitude. Clearly, 
Mannoni’s view of  human liberation was delimited by the evolutionary theories described 
above.
Fanon critiques Mannoni’s description of  Madagascans as inferior. While Mannoni links 
the inferiority complex to the study of  racial minorities in white European culture, Fanon 
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contends that “a white man in the colonies never felt inferior in any respect whatsoever”; 
he therefore concludes that Mannoni has not considered the effect of  colonial domination 
on the psychic disorders of  the colonized (2008, 73). In an analogy with Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
Anti-Semite and Jew (1948), Fanon positions the “racist who creates the inferiorized” at the 
origin of  the complex; this shows that Mannoni cannot explain the fact that the inferiority 
complex is an effect of  the European claim to superiority (2008, 74).
Fanon rejects Mannoni’s view of  inferiority among the évolué, the assimilated 
“natives,” suggesting that it is as equally erroneous as the rest of  his psychoanalytic theory 
of  dependency. Fanon was not the first to reject the notion of  a Black inferiority complex 
for the évolué. Indeed, Fanon’s epigraph from Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism 
(1950) invokes Césaire’s refutation of  the inferiority complex to describe Black existence. 
Moreover, as Gibson writes, following Paulette Nardal, the Harlem Renaissance poets 
Claude MacKay and Langston Hughes had rejected “all inferiority complexes” (2003, 42). 
These Black literary influences are integral to Fanon’s argument from “The North African 
Syndrome” onward that inferiority is socially produced, not congenital.
Citing Mannoni’s examples of  educated Black men suffering from an “inferiority 
complex,” Fanon concludes: 
So long as the author’s typical authentic Malagasy adopts his 
“dependent behavior,” all is for the best, but if  he forgets his place, 
if  he thinks himself  the equal of  the European, then the European 
becomes angry and rejects the upstart, who on this occasion and in 
this “exceptional instance” pays for his refusal to be dependent with 
an inferiority complex. (2008, 74) 
Fanon critiques Mannoni’s pathologization of  the Madagascan as follows: the Madagascan 
suffers from an inferiority complex by mistakenly assuming a position of  equality to the white 
man. If  the Madagascan accepts a position of  inferiority, then neurotic tendencies will be 
absent. Consequently, by submitting to a state of  dependency, the naturally “inferiorized” 
psychic structure of  the Madagascan enables a reaffirmation of  a relation to the primitive, 
tribal fathers.
But Fanon argues that these cases of  inferiorization are related to the arrival of  the 
white colonizer in Madagascar, who “inflicted an unmistakable wound” (2008, 77). Indeed, 
Fanon’s metaphorical wound of  colonization discloses the psychic trauma wrought by 
colonial history. Tracing this wound back to the first colonial governors, Fanon writes, “since 
Gallieni the Malagasy has ceased to exist” (74).5 Further elucidating the absolute erasure 
5 Joseph-Simon Gallieni was a French colonial officer who directed the “pacification” of  Madagascar 
by means of  military force. His exercise of  oppressive force against revolutionaries was normalized and 
reiterated in practices of  military repression across the French empire (Encyclopædia Britannica 2018).
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of  the precolonial world, which preceded the creation of  the colony, he writes, “What 
Monsieur Mannoni has forgotten is that the Malagasy no longer exists; he has forgotten that 
the Malagasy exists in relation to the European” (Fanon 2008, 77). Consequently, the lost 
precolonial subjectivity remains inaccessible for a description of  existence. Madagascans 
experience the effects of  a permanent psychic wound as colonized peoples.
The psychic wound of  colonial history reconstitutes the Madagascan in the wake of  
a rupture with an earlier identification, since the Madagascan as Madagascan did not exist 
prior to colonization. Fanon writes, “If  he is a Malagasy it is because of  the white man” (78). 
Thus, Madagascan identity is inseparable from the colonial experience. Later, in section 
III, I show the relation between Fanon’s concept of  the psychic wound as linked to colonial 
experience and Catherine Malabou’s description of  the destructive psychic transformations 
engendered by a volatile and unexpected situation of  violence in a global context. Malabou 
explicates the alteration of  identity triggered by and following an unexpected rupture as 
follows: “This ‘change in personality’ thus designates such a disruption of  identity that 
it, or the wound that causes it, constitutes a bright dividing line, between ‘before’ and 
‘after’” (2012, 15). Hence, the unexpected traumatic event produces irreversible psychic 
disruptions. This transforms the psyche subjected to the violent undoing of  pre-existent 
identities. Evidently, the psychic wound reveals an annihilated consciousness, in the wake 
of  the violent impact of  the event. 
Fanon refutes Mannoni’s dream analysis of  frightened Madagascan children, which 
draws on Freud’s sexual etiology of  the neuroses. More recently, Mannoni’s faulty 
method, which included drawing on the essays of  his French language students, who had 
a rudimentary grasp of  linguistic differences, has been critiqued and debunked.6 Fanon 
claims that Mannoni’s misreading of  the children’s dreams is the result of  his disregard for 
the cultural, social, and political conditions in Madagascar. He writes: 
We must put this dream in its time, and this time is the period during 
which 80,000 natives were killed, i.e., one inhabitant out of  fifty; 
and in its place, and the place is an island with a population of  4 
million among whom no real relationship can be established, where 
clashes break out on all sides, where lies and demagoguery are the 
sole masters. (2008, 84) 
 
Fanon traces the children’s trauma back to the 1947 revolt and the deployment of  French 
colonial force against the revolutionaries, including the habitual use of  torture. The 
frightened children were not having neurotic dreams about their absent tribal fathers, as 
Mannoni claims. Their dreams reflected instances of  psychic trauma linked to experiences 
 
6 As a teacher of  French in Madagascar, Mannoni used his students’ papers to theorize psychic disorders, 
even as his students’ grasp of  the French language was rudimentary. Both Bloch and Khanna are critical 
of  Mannoni’s psychoanalytic theory of  complexes for its reliance on French second-language papers. See 
Bloch (1990, xv) and Khanna (2003, 154). 
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of  violent repression, which affected the psychic structure of  all members of  the colonized 
community. Opposing Mannoni’s view, Fanon shows that the 1947 rebellion in Madagascar 
and the ensuing military repression by the French colonial state triggered psychic disorders 
in the Madagascans that Mannoni studied. 
Importantly, Fanon views Freud’s sexual etiologies as external to the diagnosis of  psychic 
trauma related to experiences of  violent oppression in the colonies. He writes, “Freud’s 
discoveries are of  no use to us whatsoever” (2008, 84). Instead, he shows that the torture 
of  revolutionaries in Madagascar traumatized the colonized community as a whole. When 
Madagascans dreamt of  being chased by a black bull or threatened by Black men, these 
dreams could not be understood by relying on the psychoanalytic language of  paternity, 
which, as mentioned earlier, was based on a lack of  knowledge concerning tribal roles in 
Madagascar (Bloch 1990). Fanon reframes these dream figures as the “Senegalese [who] 
were torturers in the police headquarters of  Tananarive” (2008, 84). Fanon reinterprets 
Mannoni’s dream analysis as follows: “the black bull and the black man are nothing more 
nor less than the Senegalese in the criminal investigation department” (85, n. 30). Fanon 
also shows that colonial policing creates new and distinct intra-racial hierarchies, which, by 
design, foment tensions and divisions among racialized peoples. This effectively brings the 
divide-and-conquer strategy of  colonial power into Madagascan psychic life. 
For example, according to Fanon, Mannoni fails to identify the traumatizing factor of  
military repression in the ‘black bull’ dream. In contrast, Fanon writes, “The Senegalese 
soldier’s rifle is not a penis, but a genuine Label 1916 model. The black bull and robber 
are not lolos, ‘substantial souls,’ but genuine irruptions during sleep of  actual fantasies” 
(2008, 86). In other words, the children’s dreams were related to their fear of  the violent 
colonial state, in which the torture of  the lighter-skinned Madagascan revolutionaries 
was conducted by the darker-skinned Senegalese military personnel, employed by 
the French rulers. Hence, their traumatic illnesses were related, not to sexual fantasy 
as Mannoni claimed, but to the brute force of  colonial violence and its wielding of  divisive 
racial categorizations.
In the final pages of  Fanon’s chapter on Mannoni, Fanon critiques Mannoni’s Prospero 
Complex. Mannoni draws on the character of  Prospero from Shakespeare’s The Tempest 
(1610-1611) to convey his psychoanalytic reading of  the colonial functionary. In so doing, 
Mannoni constructs a narrative of  parental abandonment: the colonial Prospero leaves his 
collective home, in which he failed to make the complete psychic transition to adulthood 
and freedom; he compensates for this failure by ruling over the lesser, dependent ‘natives’ 
in the colonies. But Fanon refutes this interpretation by arguing that it does not consider 
the fact that the colonial trader is rather “a trafficker who profits economically from his 
stint in the colonies” (2008, 88). Hence, Fanon concludes that the extraction of  economic 
profit plays an important role in the formation of  the colonial psyche. The complex of  
neurotic tendencies, writes Fanon, is dependent upon the society that creates the neurotic 
situation (80). In this regard, the unconscious complexes of  the colonial functionary cannot 
be isolated from the economic exploitation permeating colonial life. Fanon views this 
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“criminal” activity of  profit extraction, underlying the project of  colonization as inseparable 
from the psychic structure of  the colonial “trafficker.” Mannoni’s analysis of  the colonial 
functionary’s pathology is also flawed, Fanon concludes.
The colonized psyche reflects an oppressive psychic state resulting from acts of  colonial 
violence on the one hand, and, on the other, the colonial Prospero cannot be understood 
outside an analysis of  the enactment of  this violence. 
 
 
III. MALABOU’S NEW WOUNDED
In this final section of  my paper, I show how Catherine Malabou’s redefinition of  trauma, 
in light of  the psychiatric category of  the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), moves 
beyond prior definitions in psychoanalysis, which emphasize the centrality of  the Freudian 
concept of  the traumatic neurosis. Furthermore, I suggest that Fanon’s critical view of  
psychoanalysis precedes and is dialogically related to Malabou’s psychoanalytic argument, 
which builds on the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of  Mental Disorders) initial diagnostic measure of  PTSD within war zones, and 
its subsequent enlargement to cover a multitude of  violent experiences outside war zones.7 
In The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage (2012), Malabou draws from the DSM 
reports, and the research of  trauma scholars Louis Crocq, Judith Lewis Herman, and 
Ruth Leys, among others (150). By relating Malabou to Fanon, I show that Fanon’s early 
interpretation of  radical psychic transformation, engendered by the unexpected violence 
of  colonization, constitutes an important historical and critical resource for Malabou’s 
redefinition of  trauma in view of  the PTSD diagnosis. 
Malabou coins the word “cerebrality,” as distinct from a description of  the brain’s 
cerebral functions, to specify “the causal value of  the damage inflicted upon these 
functions – that is, upon their capacity to determine the course of  psychic life” (2012, 2). 
In the place of  neuroses and their demand for psychic continuity, Malabou proposes a 
cerebral etiology, which accounts for the damage to neuronal organization that ruptures 
psychic continuity, despite the survival of  the psyche. Consequently, Freud’s definition of  
traumatic neurosis is displaced by the neuropsychological profile of  PTSD, which identifies 
permanent, irreversible changes to personality, occurring in reaction to an exposure to 
violence. Malabou argues for a move to cerebrality, since it can hold drastic metamorphosis 
7 The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage contains references to the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders, 3rd edition (DSM-III) (1980); revised 3rd 
edition (DSM-III-R) (1987); and 4th edition (DSM-IV) (1994). In the DSM-V, published in 2013, the 
diagnostic criteria for PTSD was widened to include non-fear responses to traumatic situations. R.A. 
Bryant writes, “It is worth noting that the DSM‐5 definition has broadened the scope of  PTSD from 
its traditional focus on fear responses to also include other emotional reactions to trauma” (2019, 259). 
Certainly, this new evidence corroborates Malabou’s earlier insights into the ubiquity of  post-traumatic 
diagnoses in the contemporary world, classified under her term, “the new wounded.”
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in patients of  both brain damage to cerebral function and traumas related to extreme forms 
of  violence, such as abuse, assault, and war.
Malabou refers to people suffering from such psychic wounds as the new wounded. 
This appellation also holds established psychopathologies, no longer conceived as solely 
organic, but comprised of  “psychic effects” (2012, 9). In sum, the category of  the new 
wounded brings wounds resulting from neuropathological conditions linked to cerebral 
lesions, degenerative brain disease, new disorders, etc., into relation with wounds related 
to experiences of  sociopolitical violence, whose victims “display striking resemblances 
with subjects who have suffered brain damage.” Hence, the new wounded, who suffer 
in the absence of  physiological lesions, “has seen his or her neuronal organization and 
psychic equilibrium permanently changed by trauma” (10). However, Malabou concludes, 
even while the cause of  this disorganization is said to be solely “neuronal change” in 
neuropathological cases, apart from cases where an external violent situation causes this 
disorganization, it is increasingly difficult to separate these two types of  trauma, since 
oppressive violence can appear to be a senseless accident: a “traumatic blow stripped of  
all justification” (11). Importantly, for this discussion, the term the new wounded provides 
an objective designation for experiences of  PTSD, and thus the possibility for survivors to 
represent their trauma and exist in the wake of  these fissures.
It is crucial to note that the cerebral etiology identified by Malabou remains external 
to the causal link to sexuality established in psychoanalysis. Thus, Malabou displaces both 
Freud’s concept of  the traumatic neurosis and Freud’s exclusive sexual etiology of  the 
neuroses. In this regard, I argue that Fanon’s retraction of  the Freudian sexual etiology of  
the neuroses to address situations of  violent oppression in the colonies invites Malabou’s 





Malabou draws on neuroscientific data to demonstrate that events of  extreme violence 
trigger radical psychic transformations, producing permanent changes in subject formation. 
Mobilizing this data to redefine trauma, Malabou challenges “a certain psychic continuity” 
said to persist in the aftermath of  the event. In contrast, Malabou shows that the PTSD 
diagnosis severs “the very link between neurosis and trauma” (2012, 150). In regard to 
Freud, she asserts, “[f]or him, traumas and wounds do not seem capable of  creating ex 
nihilo a posttraumatic identity” (152). Malabou finds in the empirical studies evidence that 
contradicts Freud. She concludes that the received definition of  the traumatic neurosis in 
psychoanalysis can no longer be sustained, since the PTSD diagnosis nullifies the certainty 
of  psychic continuity in the aftermath of  the traumatic effraction.
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In my view, Fanon’s theory of  colonial trauma precedes Malabou’s redefinition of  
trauma. Prior to Malabou, Fanon theorizes the colonial break and rupture of  subject 
formation. As I have argued in this paper, Fanon describes the unforeseen rupture between 
precolonial and colonial life, which results in the profound destruction of  (precolonial) 
existence, rendering it permanently irretrievable. Moreover, across his published writings in 
clinical psychiatry, as well as in The Wretched of  the Earth, Fanon gestures toward a concept of  
“cerebral” trauma and asserts the need for the “recerebralization” of  existence in the wake 
of  European colonization.8 Thus, Fanon retracts Freud’s concept of  the traumatic neurosis, 
which demands psychic continuity, in his theorization of  the colonial rupture and break, 
as well as in cases of  exposure to extreme forms of  violence. Moreover, Fanon suggests 
that the cerebral brain is linked to the possibility of  psychic liberation, appearing at the 
intersection of  physiological and political oppression. This demonstrates further affinities 
with Malabou.
But Fanon does not completely dismiss the concept of  the neurosis. In chapter 6 of  
Black Skin, White Masks, “The Black Man and Psychopathology,” he asserts that Freud’s 
articulation of  the Erlebnis belongs at the origin of  neurotic behavior; it consequently reflects 
the workings of  the unconscious. Moreover, he explores the Jungian collective unconscious 
in the white colonial contexts that repress Black identity. He concludes that, since the Black 
man “has no time to ‘unconsciousnessize’ [the racial relation],” the “affective amnesia” 
of  the original event, which, for instance, appears for the white man in the form of  
guilt, is absent (2008, 129). Fanon recognizes the social conditions that produce neurotic 
behavior in racialized Black identities, as opposed to the focus on the familial environment 
in traditional psychoanalytic theory. Hence, Fanon mobilizes the concept of  the neurosis 
to analyze unconscious psychopathologies of  race, which, he argues, have not yet been 
explored. Thus, he develops a theory of  the unconscious for the Black psyche. But his 
identification of  the colonial wound and the ensuing traumas associated with exposure to 
colonial violence, I argue, complement Malabou’s unravelling of  Freud’s concept of  the 
traumatic neurosis, in light of  the diagnostic profile of  PTSD, despite this new research 
on the violent origins of  brain damage being not known to Fanon. Linking Fanon and 
Malabou, I suggest that colonial ruptures and traumas, including their respective durations, 
be represented in terms of  cerebrality and the new wounded.
 
8 In “Diagnosing the Sociopolitical Wound: Frantz Fanon and Catherine Malabou,” I show that, in “The 
North African Syndrome,” Fanon discovers the “non-lesional” wound in his North African patients and 
concludes that, while it leaves no physiological trace, it manifests as a result of  oppressive experience. In 
this regard, Fanon’s observations and analyses vis-à-vis the evidence of  unmarked wounds and traumas 
in his racialized patients complements Malabou’s concept of  the new wounded, whose survivors do not 
always present with physiological lesions (2018).
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DISPLACING THE SEXUAL ETIOLOGY OF THE NEUROSES 
Malabou declares that the “cerebral etiology of  psychic disturbances” has replaced “the 
‘sexual etiology of  the neuroses’” in psychoanalysis (2012, 2). The new research in the 
neurological sciences cannot be ignored, Malabou writes, because it has permanently 
dislocated sexuality as the evental cause for a host of  psychic disturbances (2012, xix). In 
effect, the psychic event can no longer be understood in relation to a definitive past, nor to 
any sense accessible through narrative or fantasy. The event is therefore senseless: it appears 
suddenly, as a shock, permanently damaging the cerebral brain. If  the inner drives trigger 
the destruction of  the psyche, then the posttraumatic subject reveals a psychic life, damaged 
to the point that it no longer recognizes itself, despite still being alive. This metamorphosis 
cannot subtend the validation of  the sexual etiology of  the neuroses.
Fanon does explicitly negate Freud’s sexual etiology in the case of  the Madagascans, 
but he does not go as far as Malabou to offer a theory of  cerebral trauma to replace sexual 
trauma, at least not in this early critique of  Mannoni.9 Of  course, the diagnostic criteria 
indicated by the DSM are relatively recent. But his analysis of  the Madagascan children’s 
dreams (discussed above) affirms the idea that the eruption of  the real within the confines 
of  fantasy cuts fantasy off from its origins in the sexual etiology of  the neuroses. The latter 
cannot subtend traumatic factors. In this regard, Fanon’s interpretation of  the children’s 
dreams identifies traumatic experiences, unrelated to the psychoanalytic causal link to 
sexuality. Hence, Fanon’s description of  the inassimilable character of  violent experiences, 
which remain external to fantasy, complements Malabou’s displacement of  the sexual 
etiology. In this regard, Fanon and Malabou respectively show that psychic rupture cannot 
be reduced to neurotic fantasy in cases of  extreme forms of  violence.
 
READING FANON WITH MALABOU 
Reading Fanon with Malabou, I propose that Malabou’s concept of  cerebrality be 
mobilized to develop traumatic etiologies related to historical ruptures (i.e., arrivals) and 
specific violences (e.g., tortures), which effectuate profound psychical shifts (2012, 150). 
9 This may be challenged with further evidence from Alienation and Freedom (2018). It is possible that 
Fanon’s view of  the cerebral brain, as negatively affected by colonial experience, is more closely aligned 
with Malabou’s concept of  cerebrality than previously thought. As Alia Al-Saji (2020) discussed in a 
lecture, Fanon also explicitly calls for the invention of  a new body and brain beyond colonization in The 
Wretched of  the Earth ([1961] 2004), notably when he writes: “Let us decide not to imitate Europe and let us 
tense our muscles and our brains in a new direction” (2004, 236). I read Fanon as an inheritance and as 
complementary to the idea that cerebral shocks to the fragile brain occur, due to a wide range of  violent 
experiences. 
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This necessitates bringing the concept of  cerebrality into the colonial context and paying 
greater attention to Fanon’s later insights in The Wretched of  the Earth and in his clinical 
work, published in Alienation and Freedom (2018), on torture victims, refugees, etc. This could 
potentially connect Fanon’s revolutionary forms of  psychiatry and psychoanalysis to the 
latest developments in neurology, neuropsychology, and psychoanalysis.
In particular, Fanon’s writings in the field of  clinical psychiatry show that, even as his 
work predates Malabou’s, their concepts are interrelated. For instance, in chapter 5 of  
The Wretched of  the Earth, “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” Fanon addresses how, 
in the context of  revolt and war (and therefore in circumstances much like revolutionary 
Madagascar), colonization can irrevocably mold the colonized psyche. These are certainly 
findings that Fanon further develops in the interim period between Black Skin, White Masks 
and The Wretched of  the Earth. Thus, I view the neuroscientific grounds on which Malabou rests 
her redefinition of  trauma also in relation to Fanon’s later departure from psychoanalysis 
and psychiatry, when he famously leaves the clinic and introduces new treatments and 
analyses, which takes him beyond all existing theories and practices in psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis, and, arguably, also in phenomenology.
I emphasize the importance of  further exploring the interrelated concepts and 
ideas of  Fanon and Malabou, to develop a greater understanding of  the violent origins 
of  psychic trauma. In this vein, I propose that Malabou’s elucidation of  the disclosure 
of  the irreversible, permanent transformations of  the psyche is dialogically related to 
Fanon’s theory of  colonial trauma. In effect, Malabou’s concept of  an absolute rupture, 
which arrives accidentally, either through a blow to the head, or, equally, through severe 
political oppression, follows Fanon’s understanding that the arrival of  the white man in the 
colonies constitutes a psychic event, which is catastrophic. Colonization marks an absolute 
rupture with the precolonial subjectivity, experienced as a traumatic blow that gives rise to 
irreversible psychic changes, which, in Malabou’s words, “cut the thread of  history” to the 
point that the former personality disappears completely (2012, 5). The event of  colonization 
arrives unexpectedly, cutting the Madagascans off from themselves, as they existed, prior to 
contact, without the possibility of  a return to their precolonial existence. These annihilated 
subjectivities are replaced by the identity of  the Madagascan as Madagascan, that is, as an 
originary colonized people.
The past was forever changed through the event of  colonization, which engendered a 
permanent psychic transformation. It was replaced with another past, one in which—as 
Malabou writes—“[it] is no longer the same subject who anticipates himself  and sees himself  
die,” an organic process that perceives the matter of  choosing through the life drives; the 
subject instead sculpts a path toward an inescapable death (2012, 152). The destruction of  
the past therefore generates a new subject, which no longer knows or recognizes the previous 
one, other than in terms of  annihilation, since the destructive process leaves the subject 
severed from its history, on the one hand, and on the other, kept from an anticipated future 
by means of  an oppressive force.  
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Before Malabou, Fanon analyzed wounds that do more than simply modify a previous 
personality: they create a new and unprecedented one, in which, Fanon writes, “I will try 
quite simply to make myself  white; in other words, I will force the white man to acknowledge 
my humanity” (2008, 78). The Madagascan will have no other choice but to submit to the 
oppressive colonial state, which engaged in the absolute destruction of  precolonial life and 
replaced it with colonial categories and definitions. My reading of  Fanon’s work suggests 
that a new theory of  trauma must account for psychic disorders connected to the violent 
histories of  colonization. Fanon theorizes colonial trauma, whose aftereffects spill over 
into the postcolonial world. Malabou views contemporary instances of  psychic rupture in 
relation to the oppressive forces of  globalization: her concept of  the new wounded suggests 
that psychic events must be analyzed vis-à-vis the new modes of  violence.
 
THE NEW FORMS OF PSYCHIC VIOLENCE 
By drawing out the violent origins of  psychic trauma in my reading of  Fanon and Malabou, 
I have shown that sociopolitical violence today proliferates new wounds and traumas, which 
echo those of  colonial history. I end this paper by showing that these new wounds and 
traumas, linked to situations of  globalization, are chiefly borne by the formerly colonized. 
Alia Al-Saji theorizes the colonial durée (or the colonial duration): a non-linear concept of  
time, in which racializing and colonizing practices intensify and reappear “through other 
means,” retraumatizing the bodies and cultures of  the historically oppressed (2019, 103).10 
In effect, the oppressed experience time (differentially) within the colonial duration, which 
does not advance away from its origins without eliciting new forms of  violence.
In his foreword to the 2004 edition of  The Wretched of  the Earth, Homi K. Bhabha describes 
the “colonial shadow,” in which the former colonial states demonstrate greater degrees of  
economic, social, and political oppression (xii). This calls for a critique of  the colonial 
duration and its reiterative forms of  violence. While Malabou outlines a global profile for 
psychic disorders related to the PTSD diagnosis, it is essential to notice that psychic wounds 
shatter today’s subjectivities more frequently though unevenly in postcolonial states, against 
minorities, women, children, refugees, etc. (Bhabha 2004, xxi-xvi). Even so, the new 
wounded are illegible, and the perpetrators of  violence are unidentifiable. 
Bhabha names the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 
potential resources for this violence. But his foreword reveals a longer list of  catastrophic 
10 Alia Al-Saji conceptualizes the colonial durée (or colonial duration), in order to identify the temporal 
processes of  “active forgetting” endemic to the exercise of  a Millian epistemological ignorance and to 
trace the mutating iterative practices of  racialization and colonization, which appear “through other 
means,” and reflect intensified, rephrased forms of  oppression, differentially borne by the originally 
colonized (2019, 103).
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events from ethnic cleansing campaigns to military coups to religious fundamentalist acts 
of  terrorism—in addition to the detrimental forms of  economic deprivation. I contend that 
these are implicated in World Bank and IMF policies. They tend toward the effacement of  
the traces of  their violence, which take the form of  bottomless debt bondage, healthcare 
restrictions, control on access and mobility in airports and seas, etc.  
Fanon theorized colonial ruptures, but the postcolonial entanglements that reflect 
globalized ruptures are evident in Malabou’s intimation that new modes of  violence are 
constituted as “events that mask their intentionality” (2012, 11). The concept of  cerebrality 
may be mobilized to illuminate causality, in the absence of  any signification. Moreover, it 
may elucidate psychic traumas wrought from aggressions, which leave no clear marks on 
the body and brain. Hence, the violences noted above (debt bondage, etc.) may be better 
understood once the evental cause of  today’s traumatic events is known. The expanded 
concept of  brain damage, which includes “types of  harm that do not initially pertain 
to neuropathology,” may help to designate psychic causalities associated with these new 
modes of  violence. Hence, disruptions of  neuronal organization, following experiences 
of  “extreme relational violence,” may suggest “sociopolitical traumas,” in the absence of  
physiological lesions, which are indicators of  brain damage to cerebral function (Malabou 
2012, 11). The new violence effaces the traces of  its destructive intention, and the new 
wounded manifests a psychic wound with no lesional trace.  
Fanon’s colonial wound elicits an understanding of  the original trauma, which created 
a “dividing line” between the precolonial and colonial world, while Malabou’s concept 
of  the new wounded illuminates the mutating forms of  psychic violence in the period of  
contemporary globalization. In my view, these new oppressive situations call for a radical 
form of  critique that expresses dissent against the death and destruction of  cultural, 
economic, social, and political systems, which do not conform to the industrial-military 
complex of  global capitalism. The latter produces the intensification and enlargement of  
wounds and traumas, above all in the former colonial world. Hence, recognizing causality 
is essential for the development of  resistance against the proliferation of  sociopolitical 
traumas.
Yet, instances of  violent oppression remain obfuscated by a language of  naturalization, 
inherited from the colonial era. Thus, the violent origins of  psychic trauma are still 
naturalized, but the new forms of  psychic violence now tend to bypass Manichean lines 
and potentially become mobile, while deepening existing wounds and traumas in the 
postcolonial world. As Malabou writes, the “enemy” of  global power is “hermeneutics.” 
She concludes that “it falls to neurology, psychoanalysis, and neuropsychoanalysis, starting 
from the redefinition of  trauma, to produce the sense of  this war on sense” (2012, 155). If  
the “war on sense” destroys the sense of  any possible other future, which may work toward 
the treatment and care of  survivors of  psychic trauma, then these disciplines must elucidate 
the evental cause to make sense of  the appearance of  senselessness. Violent oppression is 
lived psychically, resulting in trauma that impinges on the community as a whole, as it once 
did during the violent and destructive era of  colonization, described by Fanon. Hence, 
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communities and institutions—social bodies—are subjected to the new modes of  violence 
and are also affected by increasing levels of  traumatic experience.
A new hermeneutics must decipher the toll of  psychic damage wrought by new systems 
of  power, in order to give the survivors of  new wounds and traumas the possibility of  
representation in the aftermath of  an exposure to this violence. If  oppression continues 
to be naturalized, it will sediment into deadlier forms, eliciting an increased vulnerability 
to disease, war, hunger, climate catastrophe, etc. These new violences will fall within the 
trajectory of  the colonial duration.
The naturalization of  violent oppression has acquired new patterns of  obfuscation: not 
only does politics appear as natural—purely accidental and without reason—but nature 
seems indivisible from a politics that justifies its oppressive force with a necessary “natural law.” 
In other words, today’s violence annuls politics as natural and disappears nature “beneath 
the mask of  politics.” In this context, the psychic event lacks a clear causality. Malabou 
concludes that this “globalized heterogenous mixture of  nature and politics is brought 
to light in the worldwide uniformity of  neuropsychological reactions” (2012, 156). The 
neuroscientific data provides the resources to develop traumatic etiologies, “universally” 
held by the PTSD diagnosis. Malabou’s term the new wounded gives people, as well as 
communities, cultures, histories, and life worlds, the possibility of  representation. I have 
shown in this paper that both Fanon and Malabou elucidate the origins of  psychic trauma 
in situations of  violent oppression. Hence, identifying causality is essential for resisting this 
violence that hijacks the psyche of  its new wounded. But the psychic wounds of  colonization 
are impressed upon the origins of  contemporary violence and must also be resisted.
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